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LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR: LETTING THE AIR
OUT OF THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
DOCTRINE?
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the story of the United States Supreme Court‘s failure to properly
apply and expand the continuing violations doctrine in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber, Co.1 This is also the story of how the continuing violations
doctrine is an essential tool for Lilly Ledbetter and her supporters in their
struggle to obtain equal pay for equal work for generations of women to
come.
Ledbetter worked as an area manager at Goodyear‘s Gadsen, Alabama,
plant for nineteen years.2 A year before her retirement in 1998, she was
making fifteen percent less than the lowest paid male area manager and forty
percent less than the highest paid male area manager despite her high level of
seniority, excellent performance reviews, and the second-highest score on the
competency exam. 3 A jury found that Ledbetter was paid less because of her
sex and awarded her over three million dollars in damages. 4
However, the Supreme Court, by one vote, reversed the jury‘s decision,
not because Ledbetter failed to prove her case on the merits but because she
filed her claim outside of the statute of limitations. 5 The Court held that a
claimant must file a wage discrimination claim within 180 days of the
management‘s discriminatory decision to pay a person less because of gender,
race, color, national origin, or religion. 6 The Court declined to apply the
continuing violations doctrine to wage discrimination claims, which would
have circumvented Title VII‘s statute of limitations and allowed each
paycheck to serve as a new unlawful employment practice. 7 Instead, the
1. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
2. Id. at 2165.
3. Brief for the Petitioner at 3–4, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162
(2007) (No. 05-1074).
4. Id. at 9. Because of statutory caps, the district court judge reduced the award to
approximately $300,000. Id.
5. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2177.
6. Id. at 2179.
7. Id. at 2169. Generally, the continuing violations doctrine allows a plaintiff to bring a claim
that would otherwise be time-barred for two reasons. See Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations
Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 275 (2007). The first reason is if the claim is actually a grouping of
several separate but significantly connected claims, some of which happened within the limitations
period and some outside of it. Id. The second reason is if the claim consists of several wrongdoings
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Court held that, because the discriminatory intent involved in wage
discrimination stems not from the paycheck but from the decision to pay a
person less because of her gender, wage discrimination consists of a singular,
discrete action. 8 Therefore, the statute of limitations clock begins to run from
the date of the discriminatory decision. 9
Thus, the Court‘s ruling, by focusing on the procedural requirements of
Title VII rather than the substantive protections, makes it significantly harder
for legitimate victims of wage discrimination to recover under Title VII.
Ledbetter‘s post on the blog The Huffington Post explains why:
I just couldn‘t let Goodyear get away with it so I went to
court, and a jury agreed that Goodyear had broken the law.
They awarded me $3 million. Then a trial judge reduced it to
$300,000 because of a statutory cap on civil rights damages
that I don‘t really understand. But I knew that made
discrimination a lot less pricey, and painful, for Goodyear.
Then, by one vote, the Supreme Court took that away too,
saying that I should have filed my complaint within six
months of the original act of discrimination, even though
there was no way I could have known about it. . . .
I worked hard at Goodyear, and was good at my job. But
with every paycheck, I got less than I deserved and less than
the law says I am entitled to. The discrimination continues
today, because my pension and Social Security are based on
my pay. But because Goodyear kept [the discriminatory pay
disparity] a secret, five Justices on the Supreme Court said it
didn‘t matter. It was a step backward, and a terrible decision
not just for me but for all the women who may have to fight
wage discrimination.10
In light of the consequences caused by the Ledbetter holding and
illustrated by Ledbetter‘s personal struggle, this Comment argues that the
Court should have applied the continuing violations doctrine to wage
(that may or may not be actionable on their own) that are all connected by the same discriminatory
animus. Id. Wage discrimination claims should fall within the latter characterization because each
paycheck is a wrongdoing that is connected by the initial discriminatory decision to pay someone
less. But see id. at 321 (stating that wage discrimination claims should fall into the first
characterization because each paycheck itself represents a separate, actionable claim).
8. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
9. Id.
10. Posting of Lilly Ledbetter and Joan Blades to The Huffington Post, Peaceful Revolution:
Equal Pay for Equal Work—Time for the Senate to Vote, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lillyledbetter/empeaceful-revolutionem-e_b_98045.html (Apr. 22, 2008, 04:12 PM EST).
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discrimination claims like Ledbetter‘s for two reasons. First, failing to
classify wage discrimination claims as continuing violations is contrary to
thirty years of precedent because prior precedent supports classifying wage
discrimination claims as continuing violations.
Classifying wage
discrimination claims as continuing violations is supported by prior precedent
because wage discrimination claims have many of the same characteristics as
hostile work environment claims, which the Court classified as continuing
violations in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.11 Also,
classifying wage discrimination claims as continuing violations is further
supported by Bazemore v. Friday, where the Court recognized that each
paycheck that pays less to an African-American than to a similarly situated
white man is an unlawful employment practice. 12
Second, the Court should have classified wage discrimination claims as
continuing violations because classifying wage discrimination claims as
singular, discrete actions frustrates the purpose of Title VII and violates the
public policies behind Title VII. The holding frustrates the purpose of Title
VII because it effectively bars a significant number of claims that
substantively qualify as egregious violations of Title VII‘s prohibition of
wage discrimination.
However, because the Court has already made its decision, there must be
an act of Congress to rectify this mistake. Thus, this Comment also argues in
support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.13 The Act classifies wage
discrimination claims as continuing violations because it allows victims to
bring a claim as long as the employer issues a paycheck representing the
discriminatory pay decision within the statute of limitations.14 Statutorily
classifying wage discrimination claims as continuing violations remedies the
harm caused by the Ledbetter holding because the Act invalidates the Court‘s
significant narrowing of the continuing violations doctrine and reinforces
Title VII‘s main purpose of providing relief from discrimination on the basis
of sex.
For a complete understanding of the Ledbetter holding and the proffered
criticisms and solutions, this Comment, in Part II, will first discuss the role
and function of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
wage discrimination claims and the filing procedures for wage discrimination
claims required by Title VII. Then, in Part III, it will examine the
development of the continuing violations doctrine and trace the applicable
Supreme Court precedent. Once the necessary background is established, this
11.
12.
13.
14.

536 U.S. 101, 115, 117 (2002).
478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986).
S. 181, 111th Cong. (2009).
Id.
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Comment, in Part IV, will analyze the Ledbetter case and demonstrate why
the Court‘s holding is erroneous both on precedential and public policy
grounds. Finally, in Part V, it will weigh the merits of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act and illustrate how the Act corrects the Court‘s errors and remedies
the harms caused by the Ledbetter holding.
II. THE FUNCTION AND STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION
To fully comprehend the Ledbetter holding, one must first recognize the
role of the EEOC and examine the provision of Title VII that caused the issue
in Ledbetter.
Created under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC‘s
primary function is to enforce Title VII‘s statutory proscriptions on
discrimination.15 Prior to filing a discrimination claim in federal court, the
claimant must exhaust administrative proceedings by filing a charge with the
EEOC within 180 days of the occurrence of the act.16 Once a claim is filed,
the EEOC has ten days to notify the employer and begin its investigation. 17
After investigating the charge, if the EEOC finds that the claim is valid, then
it must try to resolve the claim informally through the process of
conciliation. 18 If the parties cannot reach a conciliation agreement, the EEOC
has two options. It may either file suit itself in the federal district court, or it
may issue a right to sue letter to the claimant, which enables the claimant to
file a private action in the federal district court.19 When the EEOC deems a
claim valid, it has 180 days from the date the claim was initially filed with the
EEOC to attempt conciliation and then pursue one of the two abovementioned options.20 However, if the EEOC determines that the claim is
invalid or it takes the EEOC longer than 180 days to make a determination,

15. Amanda J. Zaremba, Note, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan: The Filing
Quandary for Legally Ill-Equipped Employees and Eternally Liable Employers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
1129, 1131–32 (2004). Other functions include investigating complaints, operating as a mediator
between the two parties, conducting negotiations, attempting conciliation, and generally resolving the
conflict to prevent it from going into litigation. Id.; see also Kara M. Farina, Comment, When Does
Discrimination “Occur?”: The Supreme Court’s Limitation on an Employee’s Ability to Challenge
Discriminatory Pay Under Title VII, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 249, 253 (2008) (―Congress
intended the EEOC to be the leading enforcement agency in workplace discrimination.‖).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000) (requiring employee to file a charge ―within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred‖). The 180-day period is
extended to 300 days if the claim falls within a state‘s anti-discrimination law. Id.
17. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
18. Id. Conciliation is a process where a neutral party (in this case the EEOC) meets with both
sides to explore how the claim might be resolved. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (8th ed. 2004).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).
20. Id.
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then the EEOC must notify the claimant, who then has ninety days to file her
own suit in federal district court.21
According to the statute, then, the federal district court may dismiss a
discrimination claim that the EEOC found valid if the claim was not brought
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful discriminatory act.22
At issue in Ledbetter is exactly when a victim of wage discrimination
must file her claim with the EEOC. In other words, it is unclear what the
alleged unlawful discriminatory act is that causes the 180-day clock to run. In
wage discrimination claims, the alleged unlawful discriminatory act could be
either: (1) the decision to discriminate based on wage, and the date of that
decision is the start of the 180-day period; or (2) the act of paying a person
less with each paycheck, and each paycheck starts a new 180-day period.23 In
Ledbetter, the Supreme Court picked the former of the two possibilities.
However, to fully understand why the Ledbetter Court picked the date of the
decision to discriminate as the starting point for the 180-day period, and why
the Ledbetter Court‘s decision is erroneous, it helps to consider how the Court
applied the continuing violations doctrine in other circumstances where it is
unclear when the alleged unlawful discriminatory act occurred.
III. DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLANATION OF THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
DOCTRINE
Considering the development of the continuing violations doctrine as it
applies to the statute of limitations in other discriminatory actions sheds light
on the Ledbetter holding. Thus, this section will first look at the definition
and purpose of the continuing violations doctrine, and then examine how the
Supreme Court has applied and limited the doctrine in Title VII actions over a
thirty-year period.
A. Definition and Purpose of the Continuing Violations Doctrine
Generally, the continuing violations doctrine creates an exception to Title
VII‘s 180-day requirement for filing claims with the EEOC.24 The theory
behind the continuing violations doctrine is that ―if [the] alleged
discrimination is part of a ‗continuing pattern of discrimination,‘ the plaintiff

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. Graham, supra note 7, at 272–73 (stating that the doctrine has ―the effect of rescuing a
plaintiff‘s claim or claims from the statute of limitations‖); Michael Lee Wright, Note, Civil Rights—
Time Limitations for Civil Rights Claims—Continuing Violation Doctrine, 71 TENN. L. REV. 383,
384 (2004).

360

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:355

should be allowed to bring [a] claim based on the entire pattern of conduct,
not just those acts occurring within the filing period.‖ 25
Between the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and the late 1970s, federal
courts, most notably circuit courts of appeal, created several different
definitions and applications of the continuing violations doctrine. 26 Each
court-created definition falls into one of three broad types of continuing
violations: serial violations, systemic violations, and past violations that have
discriminatory effects in the present. 27
A serial violation is ―a violation . . . composed of a number of
discriminatory acts emanating from the same discriminatory animus [with]
each act constituting a separate wrong actionable under Title VII.‖ 28 Usually,
a serial violation occurs when the employer commits many discriminatory
acts against one employee. 29 For example, an employee who is denied a
promotion several times for the same discriminatory reason suffers from a
serial violation.30
Courts applied the continuing violations doctrine to serial violations
because each discriminatory act in the series originated from the same
discriminatory intent.31 However, each circuit had its own test to determine
whether the doctrine should apply. For instance, the First Circuit‘s test
mandated that the claimant demonstrate that at least one of the series of
discriminatory acts fell within the 180-day period.32 The Fifth Circuit, on the
other hand, had a three-factor test that generally required the claimant to show
a series of acts ―constituting an organized scheme leading to a present
violation.‖33 Specifically, a claimant had to prove that to some degree the acts
(1) all involved the same kind of discrimination; (2) were recurring; and (3)
―ha[d] the degree of permanence which should trigger an employee‘s
awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights.‖34

25. Susan Strebel Sperber & Craig R. Welling, The Continuing Violations Doctrine PostMorgan, 32 COLO. LAW. 57, 57 (2003).
26. See infra notes 28–50 and accompanying text.
27. Graham, supra note 7, at 304; Wright, supra note 24, at 386.
28. Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 522 (1st Cir. 1990).
29. Graham, supra note 7, at 304.
30. Jensen, 912 F.2d at 522.
31. Wright, supra note 24, at 386.
32. Jensen, 912 F.2d at 522.
33. Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Nelson v.
Williams, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1214, 1215 (D.D.C. 1981)).
34. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling that serial violations are not a
valid exception to the statute of limitations under the continuing violations doctrine in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), most circuits adopted some variation of
the Fifth Circuit test. See, e.g., Green v. L.A. County Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1480
(9th Cir. 1989); Bruno v. W. Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 1987); Valentino v. U.S. Postal
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Alternatively, systemic violations consist of a promotional policy or hiring
policy where, by the operation of the policy, minority groups are the last
considered. 35 The difference between serial violations and systemic violations
is that systemic violations involve a policy that affects a whole group where
as serial violations involve a series of actions that affect an individual. 36
Courts apply the continuing violations doctrine to systemic violations because
the unlawful action is not a result of any singular act, but rather it consists of
an ongoing illegal policy, practice, or system. 37 For a systemic violation, ―the
limitations clock does not begin to tick until the invidious conduct [or policy]
ends.‖38 Thus, a systemic violation is actionable if the claimant can show
―that a policy and practice operated at least in part within the limitation
period,‖ even if the policy or practice did not affect the plaintiff within 180
days of filing the complaint.39
The circuits have developed three different ways to measure when the
limitations clock begins to run in the event of a systemic violation. 40 First,
under the ―date of injury‖ standard, ―the statute of limitations begins to run
when the plaintiff is notified of the discriminatory policy.‖41 Second, the
―manifestation‖ standard mandates that the statute of limitations period begins
to run ―from the date of enforcement . . . of the [discriminatory] policy.‖ 42
Third, the ―ongoing policy‖ standard states that a claimant can bring a claim
as long as he ―remains subject to the [discriminatory] policy.‖43
Finally, a past violation with discriminatory effects in the present is a
situation where there used to be a discriminatory policy that has since been
abandoned by the employer, but the employees are still feeling the effects of
the policy.44 Courts applied the continuing violations doctrine to this type of
discrimination because past discrimination with significant effects in the

Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
35. See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1975).
36. See Graham, supra note 7, at 304.
37. See Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 183 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Jensen,
912 F.2d at 523 (noting that systemic violations have ―roots in a discriminatory policy or practice‖);
Green, 883 F.2d at 1480 (finding that a plaintiff can satisfy the filing requirements by showing that
―a policy or practice operated at least in part within the limitation period‖).
38. Mack, 871 F.2d at 183.
39. Green, 883 F.2d at 1480; see also Mack, 871 F.2d at 183.
40. Robert J. Reid, Confusion in the Sixth Circuit: The Application of the Continuing Violation
Doctrine to Employment Discrimination, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1335, 1344–46 (1992).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 (1977); see also infra Part
III.B.
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present ―rejuvenates the past discrimination in both fact and law regardless of
present good faith.‖45
Circuit courts originally found that any violation falling into one of these
three categories warranted the application of the continuing violations
doctrine, and therefore, they allowed the claims, despite the fact that many of
the alleged actions fell outside the statute of limitations. 46 Such liberal
application of the doctrine stemmed from the circuit courts‘ need ―to
ameliorate the harsh effects‖ of Title VII‘s original ninety-day filing period. 47
Many circuits held that valid substantive claims were unfairly barred and that
the ninety-day filing period often hindered the substantive goals of Title VII. 48
Thus, in order to advance Title VII‘s purpose, courts broadly applied the
continuing violations doctrine. 49
However, the doctrine‘s application
eventually became ―inconsistent and confusing‖ because of the many different
tests and applications of the doctrine, so the Supreme Court began to define
when to apply the doctrine. 50
B. Initial Supreme Court Limitations on the Continuing Violations Doctrine
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans51 and Delaware State College v. Ricks 52
illustrate the Court‘s first attempts at limiting and defining the continuing
violations doctrine.
In Evans, the Court determined that past violations with present effects
were not a valid continuing violation under the doctrine. 53 Evans involved a
flight attendant who was forced to resign in 1968 because, at the time, United
had a policy that required all flight attendants to remain unmarried.54 A few
months later, United eliminated its policy because of the controversy
surrounding it and entered into a new collective bargaining agreement where
affected flight attendants could seek reinstatement as long as they filed
grievances with their union. 55 Because the plaintiff did not file a grievance
45. Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div. of Ford Motor Co., 440 F.2d 1157, 1160
(8th Cir. 1971).
46. Wright, supra note 24, at 386.
47. Id. at 385. The 1972 Amendments to Title VII lengthened the filing period to 180 days.
Equal Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(e), 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5); see Evans, 431 U.S. at 554 n.3.
48. Wright, supra note 24, at 385.
49. See id. at 386.
50. Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 79 F.R.D. 580, 585 (D. Minn. 1978).
51. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
52. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
53. Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
54. Id. at 554.
55. Id. at 555; David R. Brugel & John R. Ruhl, Comment, Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 52
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 364, 364 (1977). Many United flight attendants who did not file grievances
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she was rehired as a new employee and lost all her seniority, thus affecting
her eligibility for benefits.56 She then filed a claim under Title VII alleging
that United‘s refusal to grant her pre-resignation seniority was an unlawful
discriminatory action.57
The District Court of the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Evans‘s
complaint because she did not file it within ninety days after her forced
resignation; therefore, the action was time-barred.58 The Seventh Circuit
initially affirmed the district court ruling, but after the Supreme Court handed
down its ruling in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,59 the Seventh
Circuit reheard the case and unanimously reversed. 60
The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court held that
the plaintiff‘s claim was time-barred.61 The Court reasoned that, because the
plaintiff waited four years to bring a claim instead of seeking a remedy
immediately when she was forced to resign, and because the current system
was facially neutral and legal under Title VII, it would not further the goals of
Title VII to allow her to bring a claim. 62 Consequently, the Court suggested
that a past violation that has lasting effects in the present is not a continuing
violation and therefore not an exception to the statute of limitations. 63
Three years later, in Ricks, the Court explicitly affirmed its suggestion in
Evans by holding that a past violation with effects in the present is not an
exception under the continuing violations doctrine.64 The plaintiff was a
Liberian professor at Delaware State who was denied a tenured position.
However, he was offered a one-year employment contract to give him time to
look for new employment.65 It was understood by both parties that once the
employment contract ended, the plaintiff would no longer be employed at

with the union brought suit to be reinstated immediately after United changed its policy. Id.; see also
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff in the Evans case was not
part of the Sprogis case. Evans, 431 U.S. at 554.
56. Evans, 431 U.S. at 555.
57. Id. at 556.
58. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 74 C 2530, 1975 WL 11902, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9,
1975). Because the case was filed prior to the 1972 amendments, Equal Opportunities Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(e), 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5), the applicable statute of
limitations period was ninety days. Id.
59. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The Court in Franks ruled that a facially neutral seniority system
violates Title VII when the plaintiff can demonstrate that the seniority system deprives him of
benefits because of past discriminatory actions. Id. at 764–66.
60. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976).
61. Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
62. Id. at 558–59.
63. Id.
64. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).
65. Id. at 252–54.
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Delaware State.66 When the employment contract did end, the plaintiff filed a
complaint alleging he was denied tenure and subsequently dismissed because
of his national origin. 67 The plaintiff argued that his claim was not timebarred because, even though the decision to deny him tenure was made
outside of the statute of limitations, the adverse effect did not occur until his
employment contract terminated.68
The district court dismissed the complaint because the only unlawful
employment action alleged, the denial of tenure, fell outside the statute of
limitations.69 However, the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until Ricks‘s employment ended. 70
Agreeing with the district court, the Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations began to run when the plaintiff‘s tenure was denied. 71 The Court
reasoned that ―[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient
to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.‖ 72 In
its holding, the Court stated explicitly that the focus should be on when the
actual violation occurred and not on when the effects of the violation ―became
most painful.‖73
Together, Ricks and Evans limited the continuing violations doctrine by
decreeing that one of the three definitions of a continuing violation, past
discrimination that has present effects, is not an acceptable application of the
continuing violations doctrine. However, it is important to note that in both
cases the Court‘s reason for limiting the doctrine was because the unlawful
discriminatory acts at issue were single, easily identifiable discriminatory acts
that the plaintiffs knew about long before they filed claims with the EEOC.
Thus, the Court had no issues with barring the meritorious claims.
Also, these decisions were relatively silent on the application of the
doctrine to serial and systemic violations. So, circuit courts continued to
apply the doctrine to these claims for another twenty years until the Court
once again considered the application of the continuing violations doctrine to
Title VII claims and severely limited the doctrine‘s utility.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 254–55.
Id.
Id. at 256–57.
Id.
Id. at 258 (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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C. Death of the Continuing Violations Doctrine in Title VII Cases? Morgan
and its Limitations
In 2002, the Supreme Court once again considered the continuing
violations doctrine in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.74 While
the Court did not completely kill the doctrine, it narrowed it severely by
holding that the doctrine does not apply to serial violations.
The plaintiff in Morgan alleged that he was ―consistently harassed and
disciplined more harshly than other employees on account of his race.‖ 75
While a few of the discriminatory acts he complained of took place within the
300-day limitation period,76 the majority occurred outside of the period. 77
However, the plaintiff argued that even though the bulk of the acts were
outside the filing period, all of them resulted from the same discriminatory
impulse. 78 Because all the acts derived from the same impulse, he argued that
they should be recognized as a serial violation of Title VII and that the Court
should apply the continuing violations doctrine. 79 The plaintiff also argued
that the repeated, daily use of racial slurs and epithets by fellow employees,
managers, and supervisors created a hostile work environment and that the
continuing violations doctrine should apply to the claim because a hostile
work environment, by its nature, is a continuing violation.80
The district court held that the continuing violations doctrine did not apply
to either claim because the allegations were discrete and singular, and thus,
they were time-barred.81 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the actions falling outside the limitations period were sufficiently related to
those that fell inside the limitations period; therefore, the continuing

74. 536 U.S. 101, 108 (2002).
75. Id. at 105.
76. Because he filed with a state agency first, the applicable limitations period was 300 days.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
77. The plaintiff complained that because of his race, he was given the label ―electrician‘s
helper‖ and paid less than an electrician even though he did the same work. Bernice Yeung, A Black
and
White
Issue,
SAN FRANCISCO WEEKLY,
May
1,
2002,
available
at
http://sfweekly.com/content/printVersion/313233. He also alleged that he was constantly subjected
to racial slurs; disciplined for things white co-workers were not disciplined for; denied access to
training programs because his supervisors told him he lacked the mental capacity; and fired for the
pretextual reason of threatening a supervisor when he was actually fired for complaining too many
times about such racist treatment. Id. However, the plaintiff did not file his complaint with the
EEOC until he was fired. Id.
78. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see Zaremba, supra note 15, at 1138.
81. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
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violations doctrine precluded them from being time-barred because they were
classified as serial violations.82
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part by distinguishing
between the serial violations and the hostile work environment claim. 83 It
held that the continuing violations doctrine did not apply to serial violations
but that it did apply to the hostile work environment claim. 84 Because the
alleged serial violations consisted of acts such as failure to promote, denial of
training, or denial of transfer, the Court characterized the claims as discrete
and easily identifiable. 85 Because the acts were discrete and easily
identifiable, ―each [discriminatory] adverse employment decision constitutes a
separate actionable ‗unlawful employment practice.‘‖ 86 Even though each
discrete action had the same discriminatory impulse, the Court held that the
continuing violations doctrine did not apply because the actions involved were
actions that were separately actionable and easy to identify as discriminatory,
and such easy identification warranted a strict application of the 180/300-day
limitation. 87
However, the Court held that the continuing violations doctrine did apply
to the hostile work environment claim because the nature of the claim
necessitated the exception. 88 The Court differentiated between serial
violations and a hostile work environment, noting that hostile work
environments are not easily identifiable or separately actionable. 89 Also, the
Court acknowledged that the actionable unlawful employment practice
―involves repeated conduct. . . . [and] [t]he unlawful employment practice
therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day‖ but usually happens
over several days, months, or years.90 Additionally, the Court noted that
hostile work environment claims are difficult to prove in a short period of
time because the plaintiff, to be successful, must be aware of the

82. Id. at 106–07.
83. Id. at 105.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 114; see Farina, supra note 15, at 266.
86. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
87. Id.; see Joseph M. Aldridge, Note, Pay-Setting Decisions as Discrete Acts: The Court
Sharpens Its Focus on Intent in Title VII Actions in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S.
Ct. 2162 (2007), 86 NEB. L. REV. 955, 966 (2008).
88. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
89. Id. at 115–17; see Aldridge, supra note 87, at 966 (―A divided court held that because such
claims allege a series of incidents, some of which may be difficult to identify and are not
independently actionable, such claims collectively formed a single allegation of an offensive or
intimidating atmosphere.‖).
90. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; see Zaremba, supra note 15, at 1144 (noting that the
unemployment practice cannot have ―occurred on one day, but rather requires days and even years of
accumulated conduct to constitute a valid claim.‖).
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discrimination and show that the discrimination in the work place is hostile
and abusive enough to offend a reasonable person.91
As a result, while the Morgan Court severely limited the range of the
continuing violations doctrine because it eliminated the traditional category of
serial violations, it did not do away with the doctrine entirely, like many
critics claim. 92 As shown above, the Court did endorse the application of the
doctrine to hostile work environment claims, and it still has not commented
on the applicability of the doctrine to systemic violations. This suggests that
the Court could expand the doctrine by applying it to certain discriminatory
acts for policy reasons. In fact, precedent exists suggesting that the Court
should apply the doctrine to wage discrimination claims.
D. Possible Expansion of the Continuing Violations Doctrine to Wage
Discrimination Claims: Bazemore v. Friday
Bazemore v. Friday93 provides precedent allowing the Court to apply the
continuing violations doctrine to wage discrimination claims even though
wage discrimination claims are technically serial violations. The Bazemore
Court‘s classification of pay disparities as current violations of Title VII and
the Court‘s use of the paycheck to support this classification demonstrate that
the Court considered the paycheck as a manifestation of the current violation.
Bazemore also implies that wage discrimination claims are unique and their
tendency to perpetuate discrimination justifies allowing claims where that are
otherwise time-barred.
Bazemore does not involve a statute of limitations claim or an individual
wage discrimination claim but instead deals with a discriminatory pay scale
that was enacted prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 94 The
pay scale in place prior to August 1, 1965, divided whites and African91. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)); see
Graham, supra note 7, at 303 (discussing the subjective and objective components of a hostile work
environment claim and how those components show that hostile work environment claims ―typically
are comprised of many slights instead of a single egregious event, . . . [making] it especially difficult
for potential plaintiffs to determine when their claims have accrued.‖).
92. See Sperber & Welling, supra note 25, at 60 (―From a purely technical standpoint, the
Court in Morgan did away with the continuing violations doctrine.‖); Zaremba, supra note 15, at
1134 (explaining how the Supreme Court rejected the application of the doctrine to Title VII claims
in Morgan). But see Aldridge, supra note 87, at 978 (―Morgan thus constrained the continuing
violation theory to hostile work environment claims . . . .‖).
93. 478 U.S. 385 (1986). This decision was a per curiam decision, but much of the analysis
relevant to this Comment is contained in Justice Brennan‘s concurrence. Id. at 386–87 (―We hold,
for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that under [Title VII] . . . the Extension Service had no duty to eradicate salary disparities
between white and black workers that had their origin prior to the date Title VII was made applicable
to public employers . . . .‖).
94. Id. at 390–91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Americans into two branches where the African-Americans were given lower
salaries than the whites.95 After August 1, 1965, the employer integrated the
two branches but did not correct the pay scale. 96 A class of African-American
employees filed a wage discrimination claim asking the court to make the
employer eliminate the pay disparities between whites and AfricanAmericans.97 The court of appeals held that the employer did not have a duty
to eliminate the disparities caused by a policy that was not illegal at the time
when it was in place. 98
The Supreme Court held that the employer did have a duty because a
present violation of Title VII existed despite the fact that the policy no longer
was in place and all that remained was the effects of the policy. 99 The
employer argued that the Court‘s holding went against United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Evans100 because there the Court held that the past discrimination with
present effects was time-barred.101
However, the Bazemore Court
distinguished Evans by characterizing the pay disparities themselves as
current violations of Title VII.102 The Court found that the pay disparity was
the present violation because it reasoned that ongoing pay disparities
perpetuate discrimination.103 The Court articulated that just because the
employer
discriminated with respect to salaries prior to the time it was
covered by Title VII does not excuse perpetuating that
discrimination after the [employer] became covered by Title
VII. To hold otherwise would have the effect of exempting
from liability those employers who were historically the
greatest offenders of the rights of blacks. 104
Bazemore, then, generally implies that it is against public policy not to correct
pay disparities because failing to correct them exempts employers from
liability and perpetuates discrimination.
It is also important to note that the Bazemore Court saw the paycheck as a
manifestation of the pay disparity: ―Each week‘s paycheck that delivers less
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 386–87.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 386–87, 396.
100. 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
101. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 396.
102. Id. at 396 n.6; see Farina, supra note 15, at 265.
103. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395–96.
104. Id.
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to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title
VII . . . .‖105 This demonstrates that the Court regarded the paycheck as
representative of the pay disparity, and thus the current violation, because it
characterized the violation in terms of a paycheck. Employing the paycheck
as a manifestation of the current violation allowed the Bazemore Court to put
aside the procedural barrier to the claim (the fact that the action causing the
pay disparity fell outside the enactment of the Civil Rights Act) in order to
further the policy goals of Title VII because it gave the Court something
current to base the claim on.
Indeed, the past thirty years of precedent suggests that the Court has a
general policy of circumventing the statute of limitations or other procedural
barriers to further the substantive goals of Title VII. In fact, courts used the
continuing violations doctrine more often and broadly applied the doctrine
when the limitations period was significantly shorter and thus more likely to
bar meritorious suits. However, such broad usage caused confusion and
inconsistency in the application of the doctrine, which is why the Court began
limiting its utility in Evans and Ricks. And even though the Court in Morgan
severely limited the doctrine‘s utility, Morgan still demonstrates the Court‘s
willingness to use the doctrine when it believes there is good public policy to
allow the claim to proceed. 106 The issue for wage discrimination claims, then,
is whether the public policy behind preventing wage discrimination is enough
for the Court to apply the doctrine. In light of Morgan and Bazemore, it
seems like the doctrine should apply to wage discrimination claims.
However, the Ledbetter Court disagreed and held that the doctrine does not
apply.107
IV. THE COURT‘S FAILURE TO APPLY THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
DOCTRINE TO WAGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR
In order to effectively analyze the Ledbetter holding, it is necessary to
consider the facts, precedential history, and reasoning of the case. Thus, this
Comment discusses the case before arguing that the holding goes against prior
precedent and public policy.
A. Discussion of Ledbetter
The United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether the
continuing violations doctrine applies to wage discrimination suits in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.108 The Court held that a wage
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
See, e.g., supra Part III.C (analyzing Morgan‘s hostile work environment claim).
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007).
Id.
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discrimination claim brought under Title VII is a discrete, easy-to-identify act,
and therefore is not subject to the continuing violations exception to Title
VII‘s statute of limitations.109
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter, worked at Goodyear‘s Gadsen,
Alabama, plant from 1979 to her early retirement in 1998 primarily as an area
manager.110 During her tenure at Goodyear, salaries of area managers would
increase only if the business center manager believed they deserved a yearly
raise.111 Business center managers made their decisions based on yearly
performance rankings, reports from performance auditors, and their own
―subjective impressions.‖112 As a result of this system, Ledbetter often did not
receive a yearly raise, or if she did, it was significantly smaller than her male
counterparts.113 By 1997, she was making fifteen percent less than the lowestpaid male area manager (who had significantly less seniority and experience)
and forty percent less than male area managers with ―equal or less
seniority.‖114 When she retired in 1998, she filed a claim with the EEOC.115
Goodyear argued that Ledbetter‘s claim was time-barred because none of
the alleged discriminatory acts took place after September 26, 1997, exactly
180 days from when Ledbetter filed her complaint with the EEOC. 116
Substantively, Goodyear maintained that the merit system was neutral and
that Ledbetter was paid less because that is what her performance dictated.117
However, Ledbetter offered several pieces of evidence demonstrating that
Goodyear‘s proffered reasons were pretextual. First, Ledbetter presented
evidence that her performance rankings were inaccurate and sometimes
falsified for various reasons. 118 She showed that other area managers and
various supervisors believed her work was of high quality and that she won a
―Top Performance Award‖ in 1996.119 She also demonstrated that her onetime direct supervisor and performance auditor threatened to give her (and

109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 3–4. When Ledbetter was promoted
to area manager, she scored the second-highest on the competency exam out of forty-five applicants
for the job. Id.
111. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 4. In 1997, Ledbetter was making $3727 per month while the lowest-paid male area
manager was making $4286 per month, and the highest-paid male area manager was working $5236
per month. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Thus, Ledbetter was making
$6000 less per year than the lowest-paid male and $18,000 less a year than the highest-paid male.
115. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
116. Id. at 2166.
117. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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eventually did give her) poor performance evaluations if she continued
rejecting his sexual advances. 120 Second, Ledbetter offered evidence of
widespread gender discrimination at the plant. 121 Third, Ledbetter illustrated
that her work environment was hostile toward women. 122
The district court rejected Goodyear‘s statute of limitations claim and let
the substantive issue of the Title VII pay discrimination claim go to trial. 123
The jury found that ―it was more likely than not‖ that Ledbetter was paid less
because of her sex and awarded her $223,776 in back pay, $4662 for mental
anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive damages.124
Goodyear appealed on the statute of limitations claim, and the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, reasoning that the
claim was time-barred by the 180-day filing limit.125 The appellate court
stated that even though there were two pay decisions made within the
limitations period,126 the evidence from those two pay decisions alone was
insufficient to uphold the jury‘s verdict. 127
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Ledbetter argued that her
claim was timely. Relying heavily on Bazemore, Ledbetter asserted that each
paycheck issued where she was paid less than her male counterparts was a
separate act of discrimination and that the series of violations comprised a
120. Id. at 5–6. When Ledbetter confronted this man about her poor evaluations, he told her
that it was because she was ―just a little female and these big old guys . . . [would] beat up on me and
push me around and cuss me.‖ Id. After this confrontation, Ledbetter claimed that her evaluations
got worse. Id. Goodyear was supposed to retain these evaluations, but the records were not
preserved. Id.
121. Id. at 7. There were only two other female area managers during Ledbetter‘s employment,
and both made less than their male counterparts. Id. The first area manager testified at trial that her
male supervisors told her she would be given low ratings because they did not think women were
capable of handling the job. Id. The second area manager transferred from a secretarial position to
the area manager position; however, she retained her secretarial pay and was making less than the
men she supervised. Id.
122. Id. at 8. She was constantly told that the plant did not need women because they were
―troublemakers.‖ Id.
123. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007). The district
court did grant Goodyear‘s motion for summary judgment on several other claims, including an
Equal Pay Act claim. Id.
124. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 9. By law, the district court had to reduce the
back pay award to $60,000 because a plaintiff cannot receive more than two years‘ back pay. Id.
The court, to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D), also reduced the punitive damage award to
$295,338. Id.
125. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166.
126. There was a decision made to deny Ledbetter a raise in the fall of 1997 and in the
beginning of 1998. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 10.
127. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166. The Eleventh Circuit did recognize that ―a Title VII claim
challenging an employee‘s pay was not time-barred so long as the plaintiff received within the
limitations period at least one paycheck implementing the pay rate the employee challenged as
unlawful.‖ Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).

372

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:355

continuing violation. 128 She argued that the Bazemore precedent created a
―‗paycheck accrual rule‘ under which each paycheck, even if not
accompanied by discriminatory intent, triggers a new EEOC charging period
during which the complainant may properly challenge any prior
discriminatory conduct that impacted the amount of that paycheck, no matter
how long ago the discrimination occurred.‖129 Essentially, Ledbetter argued
that in light of Bazemore‘s use of the paycheck as a manifestation of the
current violation caused by the pay disparity, the Court should apply the
continuing violations doctrine. 130
The Court, however, held that Ledbetter‘s wage discrimination claim was
not a continuing violation but a discrete act that was time-barred by the 180day limitation. 131 For such claims, the statute of limitations begins to run
when the discriminatory pay decision is made because that is the action which
contains the necessary discriminatory intent.132 The Court distinguished
Bazemore, explaining that a paycheck represents a current violation of Title
VII only when the pay scale is facially discriminatory, like in Bazemore,
because the facially discriminatory nature of the scale causes the employer to
engage in intentional discrimination each time a paycheck is issued. 133
However, the Court reasoned that the pay structure in Ledbetter was facially
neutral and the paychecks stemming from the pay structure, by extension,
were also neutral, so there was no discrimination associated with each
paycheck.134
In further support of its holding, the Court used prior precedent and policy
justifications for the strict adherence to the statute of limitations. The Court
contended that prior precedent supported its ruling because Ledbetter argued
―simply that Goodyear‘s conduct during the charging period gave present
effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period,‖ but Evans, Ricks, and
Morgan held that such conduct does not fall under the continuing violation
exception to the statute of limitations. 135
Also, the Court reasoned that a short statute of limitations is good public
policy because it requires complainants to file promptly. 136 Prompt filing is

128. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173.
129. Id. at 2172.
130. See supra Part III.D.
131. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2173; see Farina, supra note 15, at 265; Tristian K. Green, Insular Individualism:
Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 363
(2008).
134. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173; see Green, supra note 133, at 363.
135. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.
136. Id. at 2170.
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advantageous because as time passes, it becomes harder for ―the parties and
the fact finder to reconstruct what actually happened.‖137 Finally, the Court
noted that the statute of limitations also ―protect[s] employers from the burden
of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past.‖138
B. Ledbetter Was Wrongly Decided Because Its Holding Goes Against Prior
Precedent and Public Policy
The Court‘s holding in Ledbetter is erroneous on two accounts. First, the
holding goes against prior precedent because it ignores how substantially
different wage discrimination claims are from traditional serial violations.
Second, the holding goes against public policy because it frustrates the core
purpose of Title VII—providing relief for discrimination based on race,
national origin, color, religion, and gender.
1. The Ledbetter Holding is Contrary to Morgan, Bazemore, and the
Appellate Courts‘ Treatment of the Issue
The Ledbetter holding goes against prior precedent because Morgan and
Bazemore collectively stand for the proposition that claims that are hard to
identify and perpetuate discrimination should be subject to the continuing
violations doctrine in order to properly further the substantive goals of Title
VII. As Part III.C demonstrated, Morgan differentiated between two kinds of
claims: ―discrete acts‖ that are ―easy to identify‖ and recurring acts that are
hard to identify and ―cumulative in impact.‖139 As examples of easy-toidentify acts, the Morgan Court listed ―termination, failure to promote, denial
of transfer, or refusal to hire.‖140 As examples of recurring acts that are hard
to identify, the Court‘s only example was a hostile work environment
claim. 141 The Court declined to apply the continuing violations doctrine to the
discrete acts because the ease of identification associated with discrete acts
warranted strict adherence to Title VII‘s statute of limitations. 142
However, the Court applied the doctrine to hostile work environment
claims because the nature of the claims necessitates an exception to the statute
of limitations in order to further the substantive goals of Title VII. 143 The
Morgan Court viewed hostile work environments as ―comprised of many
137. Id. at 2171.
138. Id. at 2170 (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 49 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1980)).
139. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–15 (2002); see Graham, supra
note 7, at 304; Sperber & Welling, supra note 25, at 59.
140. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
141. Id. at 115; see supra Part III.C (discussing why the Court applied the continuing violations
doctrine to hostile work environment claims).
142. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
143. Id. at 115.
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slights instead of a single egregious event . . . [which] makes it especially
difficult for potential plaintiffs to determine when their claims have
accrued.‖144 Thus, the Court recognized that the nature of such claims causes
the plaintiff trouble because it is much easier for the plaintiff to run the risk of
filing too soon or filing too late.145 If the plaintiff files too soon, then the
plaintiff might not be able to show that the hostile work environment is
abusive enough to offend a reasonable person.146 If the plaintiff files too late
because she was waiting for enough evidence to demonstrate that the
environment was hostile enough to offend a reasonable person, her claim
could be time-barred.147
Because wage discrimination claims fit better in the hard-to-identify
recurring acts category than the easy-to-identify discrete acts category,
Morgan mandates the application of the continuing violations doctrine to
wage discrimination claims.148 Wage discrimination claims are hard to
identify in two ways. First, because a discriminatory pay decision often takes
the form of a subtle action, an employee may not discern that the employer is
discriminating against her until she notices a pattern develop, which may take
many years.149 For example, a woman who receives a smaller pay increase in
2007 may have no reason to suspect discrimination until she receives a
smaller increase in 2008, 2009, and 2010 despite good performance reviews
and other positive feedback.150 Second, because salary information is often
kept confidential, a woman may not even know that she received a smaller
pay increase than her fellow male employees and consequently may not know
that the pay decision had discriminatory effects. 151 Considering the inherent
subtle nature of wage discrimination and the taboo associated with disclosing
salary information in the workplace, wage discrimination claims may be
harder to identify than hostile work environment claims.

144. Graham, supra note 7, at 303.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Aldridge, supra note 87, at 978–79; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2007) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (claiming that wage discrimin ation
claims ―have a closer kinship to hostile work environment claims than to charges of a single episode
of discrimination‖).
149. See Aldridge, supra note 87, at 980.
150. Id.
151. Marcia D. Greenberger, Editorial, Paycheck Fairness is not a Burden, W ASH. POST, Aug.
20, 2007, at A14 (―Few employees have concrete information about the pay of peers to compare with
their own, let alone whether discrimination played a role in pay decisions.‖); see also Julie F. Kay &
Gillian L. Thomas, A Chance to End Pay Gap, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 19, 2007, at 95
(―Many employers even have policies forbidding workers from disclosing their pay. Consequently,
an employee who receives lower pay is unlikely to know his or her peers are paid more.‖).
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The differences between wage discrimination claims and other discrete,
easy-to-identify acts provide further proof that wage discrimination claims fit
into Morgan‘s hard-to-identify classification. Take a situation where the
employer failed to promote a female employee. In that situation, the
employee usually knows immediately that (1) she did not get the promotion
and (2) who got the promotion over her. Thus, if a less experienced white
male was chosen over her, she immediately has enough evidence to warrant
filing a claim with the EEOC. However, as discussed above, the nature of
wage discrimination claims does not allow for the same immediate suspicion
as failure to promote claims. Because of the subtle nature of discriminatory
pay decisions and the common confidentiality of the salaries of fellow
employees, a victim of a discriminatory pay decision, unlike a victim of a
discriminatory refusal to promote, may not have any reason to be suspicious.
In addition to being hard to identify, wage discrimination claims, as
Bazemore implies, are recurring violations that are cumulative in impact.
Bazemore states that the pay disparity itself is a current violation of Title VII,
despite the origin of the pay disparity, because pay disparities themselves
perpetuate discrimination. 152 Bazemore also asserts that the paycheck
encapsulating the disparity is a manifestation of the current violation.153 Thus,
each paycheck representing a pay disparity is representative of a violation of
Title VII. However, in the case of wage discrimination, pay disparities are
initially slight,154 and to become noticeable enough to justify filing a claim
under Title VII, the employee needs to wait for the paychecks to
accumulate.155
In this sense, wage discrimination claims are exactly like hostile work
environment claims. In a hostile work environment claim, one racial slur,
though technically actionable, realistically may not be enough to warrant
filing a claim, but several slurs over many months is enough to warrant filing
a claim. 156 In a wage discrimination claim, a small disparity in pay
realistically may not be enough to justify filing a claim (because the disparity
may not be enough evidence to allow the claimant to win on the merits) but
over the course of many years, that small disparity can grow to quite a
significant disparity that will surely suggest discrimination. 157 So, for a wage
152. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986).
153. Id. at 395–96.
154. Aldridge, supra note 87, at 980.
155. In a compensation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she is paid less than men; and (3) there is significant similarity in the two jobs. AFSCME
v. Washington, 770 F. 2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985).
156. Graham, supra note 7, at 303.
157. See Kay & Thomas, supra note 151 (―One recent study from Carnegie Mellon University
showed . . . that if a woman with a master‘s degree started out her career earning $5,000 less per year
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discrimination claim to be an effective claim under Title VII, it must be a
claim that is recurring and cumulative in impact.
Morgan and Bazemore, then, demonstrate that the Ledbetter Court erred
in classifying wage discrimination claims as discrete, easy-to-identify acts and
therefore erred in strictly adhering to the 180-day limitation. A comparison of
wage discrimination claims to hostile work environment claims shows that
wage discrimination claims are just as complex as hostile work environment
claims. So, the Court should have followed Morgan and given wage
discrimination claims the benefit of the continuing violations doctrine like it
gave hostile work environment claims.
Indeed, prior to Ledbetter, many circuits interpreted Morgan and
Bazemore as mandating application of the continuing violations doctrine to
wage discrimination claims because wage discrimination claims necessitated
circumventing the 180-day limitation.158 Most notably, Shea v. Rice, 159 a case
coming out of the D.C. Circuit in 2005, held that each paycheck an employee
receives is an actionable wrong and that Bazemore is controlling in regards to
whether the action is barred by the 180-day limitation period.160 The court
held that because such discrimination constitutes a ―‗pattern [that] was begun
prior to‘ the limitations period,‖ the suit was not time-barred. 161
However, the Ledbetter Court failed to make the same conclusions as the
appellate courts. Instead, the Court hedged the Morgan/Bazemore precedent.
The Court focused solely on the discriminatory pay decision. Such focus
allowed the Court to ignore the fact that wage discrimination as a whole is
hard to identify. The Court could also ignore the fact that a claim is usually
meritorious only when the disparity is noticeable enough to show a
cumulative pattern. When those considerations are left out of the equation, all
that is left is the single act of the employer deciding to pay a woman less
because of her gender. Superficially, this is a discrete and easy-to-identify
act. However, upon a closer look, a discriminatory pay decision is not a
stand-alone decision like a decision not to promote a woman because, as
shown above, the discrimination associated with this decision is not
than her male counterpart, yet both received identical 3 percent annual increases, the female
employee would have a pay disparity totaling more than half a million dollars by the time she
reached age 60.‖).
158. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Fed‘n Employment and Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir.
2005); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dept. of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2003); Goodwin v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1010 (10th Cir. 2002); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257
(3d Cir. 2001).
159. 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This is actually a case concerning a federal employee with
a pay discrimination claim brought under the Foreign Service Act, but the procedural requirements
are the same and thus the precedent of Morgan and Bazemore applies. Id. at 456.
160. Id. at 452–53.
161. Id. (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395–96).
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immediately noticeable or identifiable and the effects of the decision are much
longer lasting than the other acts classified as discrete and easy-to-identify. 162
Therefore, the Ledbetter Court should have acknowledged Morgan‘s and
Bazemore‘s application of the continuing violations doctrine to complex
claims.
2. The Ledbetter Holding Violates Public Policy Because It Frustrates the
Purpose of Title VII
The Ledbetter Court should have applied the continuing violations
doctrine to wage discrimination claims not only because it ignored prior
precedent but also because strict adherence to the 180-day limitation period
frustrates the purpose of Title VII. The holding frustrates the purpose of Title
VII by significantly limiting the number of substantively meritorious wage
discrimination claims. As the reasoning in both Morgan and Bazemore
suggests,163 the purpose of using the continuing violations doctrine as an
exception to the 180-day statute of limitations is because it furthers the
substantive goals of Title VII. The core purpose of Title VII is to ―make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination.‖164 A secondary purpose of Title VII (and the primary
purpose of the 180-day limitation provision in Title VII) is to encourage
voluntary compliance and to avoid needless litigation.165 The Court‘s holding
in Ledbetter promotes the secondary purpose over the primary purpose by
upholding the 180-day limitation over Ledbetter‘s clearly viable claim. In
doing so, the Court sets the precedent and therefore inherently limits the
number of wage discrimination claims that will be litigated on the merits.
However, because of the nature of wage discrimination claims, it will be
nearly impossible to successfully bring a substantive discrimination suit for
three reasons. First, 180 days is often not enough time even to discover that a
discriminatory pay decision was made. This is because pay disparities are
often confidential and therefore unknown. 166 Indeed, in Ledbetter‘s case, the
salaries of other Goodyear employees were kept confidential, and Ledbetter

162. See generally Kay & Thomas, supra note 151.
163. See supra Part IV.B.1.
164. Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); see also Brief for the
Petitioner, supra note 3, at 24.
165. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
166. See Kay & Thomas, supra note 151 (stating that employers have policies forbidding
disclosure of salaries); Editorial, Fair Pay, the Right Way: The House Overcorrects the Supreme
Court Decision, WASH. P OST, Aug. 14, 2007, at A12 (―Employers jealously guard pay information,
and credible specifics about who‘s being paid what are rarely the subject of lunchroom chit-chat.‖);
see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2007) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (―Compensation disparities . . . are often hidden from sight.‖).
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only learned of her situation by an anonymous note left in her mailbox. 167 If
employees do not have access to colleagues‘ salaries, how are they to
ascertain in a six-month period whether they are making less than others
similarly situated? It is even harder to determine pay discrimination when the
employee is passively discriminated against. In this situation, the similarly
situated males are given raises, but the female is not, or the female is given a
substantially smaller raise. 168 Because it is generally inappropriate to discuss
salaries and raises, how is the female to discern that a discriminatory pay
decision was made?
Second, because the substantial effects of a discriminatory pay decision
are cumulative in nature, it will be hard to adhere to the 180-day limitation.
The cumulative effect is significant because ―[p]ay disparities often occur . . .
in small increments.‖169 This means that most employees do not begin to
suspect pay discrimination until a significant amount of time passes. 170 A
secondary problem is that sometimes the initial discrepancies will be so
minute that the employee will not even have enough evidence to claim a Title
VII violation.171
Finally, such adherence to the 180-day limitation actually goes against the
purpose the Court was trying to promote—mainly, that strict enforcement of
the statute of limitations will reduce the number of frivolous and arbitrary
lawsuits filed. This is because at the slightest indication of a discriminatory
pay decision, it will be in the plaintiff‘s best interest to file a claim with the
EEOC immediately.172 Therefore, Ledbetter‘s rigorous application of the
180-day limitation frustrates the purpose of Title VII because it not only
significantly limits the ability of a plaintiff to bring successfully a meritorious
claim but also creates the incentive for frivolous filings.
The Ledbetter Court, then, not only ignored precedent but also frustrated
the purpose of Title VII in erroneously failing to apply the continuing
violations doctrine. The Court ignored precedent by refusing to acknowledge
the tradition of applying the continuing violations doctrine to complex claims
that are recurring and hard to identify. The Court frustrated the purpose of
Title VII by putting the secondary purpose of enforcing procedural
requirements to weed out frivolous lawsuits over the primary purpose of
remedying unlawful discrimination.

167. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182; Amendment of Title VII: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Lilly Ledbetter).
168. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182.
169. Id. at 2178; see Aldridge, supra note 87, at 979–80.
170. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178–79.
171. Id. at 2179.
172. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 27.
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V. CORRECTING THE COURT: THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
Even in the short time since the Court handed down Ledbetter, federal
district courts and federal courts of appeals have denied seemingly
meritorious claims using Ledbetter‘s misguided analysis concerning when the
statute of limitations begins to run in cases with apparent ongoing
violations.173 For example, the Seventh Circuit, citing Ledbetter, dismissed a
case brought by African-Americans alleging that the Chicago Fire Department
was engaging in ongoing discriminatory hiring practices because the fire
department‘s actions did not meet Ledbetter‘s narrow definition of a
continuing violation. 174 Because the fire department‘s actions were not
classified as a continuing violation, the claim was barred by the statute of
limitations.175
The lower courts have also expanded Ledbetter‘s application beyond Title
VII to other federal civil rights laws. For instance, in Garcia v. Brockway, 176
the Ninth Circuit, relying on Ledbetter, denied a handicapped person‘s claim
alleging that his apartment building did not comply with the Fair Housing Act
because he brought the claim within two years after he moved into the
apartment and not within two years of construction of the building. 177
These cases, which clearly are contrary to the substantive purpose of Title
VII and other civil rights laws, create a need for corrective legislation.
Congress once again has answered that need. 178 On January 8, 2009, the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (the Act) was introduced in the Senate.179 The
Act amends section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964180 and declares that
173. See Robert Pear, Justices’ Ruling in Discrimination Case May Draw Quick Action by
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13.
174. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 492–94 (7th Cir. 2008).
175. Id.
176. 503 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 1097–98. Two years was the duration of the statute of limitations in this case. Id.
178. Congress has in the past legislatively corrected the Court‘s narrow interpretation and
application of the 180-day statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2), amended by Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); infra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.
179. S. 181, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill had fifty-four co-sponsors in the Senate and was
signed into law on January 29, 2009. GovTrack.us., S. 181: Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-181 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). In June 2007,
the House of Representatives introduced and passed an identical bill, The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2007. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007). The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 had ninetythree co-sponsors in the House and passed on July 31, 2007. GovTrack.us., H.R. 2831: Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=main&bill=h1102831 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). The bill then passed to the Senate, and on April 23, 2008, a motion
for cloture was brought up in the Senate (a motion to cut off debate and force a vote on the bill); the
motion was rejected by a 56-42 vote, and the bill died. Id.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000). This is the provision that contains the 180-day limitation.
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an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to
discrimination in compensation in violation of [Title VII],
when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or
when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or
other practice.181
The Act reverses Ledbetter and states that a new EEOC claim may be
filed with the issuance of each discriminatory paycheck. Essentially, the Act
recognizes that a pay discrimination claim, like Ledbetter‘s, is a continuing
violation because the Act adopts the paycheck accrual rule that the Court in
Ledbetter rejected.
Also, the Act acknowledges that an exception must be made to Title VII‘s
statute of limitations in order to remain true to the intended purpose of Title
VII. In the Act, Congress expresses its dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court‘s decision:
The Supreme Court in [Ledbetter] significantly impairs
statutory protections against discrimination in compensation
that Congress established and that have been bedrock
principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter
decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly
restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination
can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation
decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of
Congress.182
This expression of dissatisfaction strongly supports the argument that the
Court erroneously focused on the procedural aspects of Title VII instead of
the vastly more important substantive protections afforded by the Civil Rights
Act. It also indicates that Congress values remedying substantive claims over
enforcing the procedural requirements.
Indeed, this is not the first time that Congress has corrected the Court for
over-emphasizing the statute of limitations provision. The 1991 Civil Rights
See supra Part II.
181. S. 181, 111th Cong. § (3)(A) (2009).
182. Id. § (2)(1).
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Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(5)(e)(2) to correct the Court‘s holding in
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.183 In Lorance, the employer had a collectivebargaining agreement that enacted a seniority system where employees
generally accrued seniority based on the number of years working at the
plant.184 However, in 1979, a new collective-bargaining agreement changed
the accrual of seniority for the highly paid position of ―tester.‖185 The position
of tester was traditionally a male-held position, but in the early 1970s, women
became testers too. 186 When the plant had to lay off employees in 1982
because of poor economic performance, most of the female testers were
demoted.187 They brought a claim to the EEOC claiming that the seniority
system was a discriminatory employment action. 188 The Supreme Court held
that the claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run
from the date when the new seniority system was enacted. 189
By adding section 2 to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, Congress reversed the
Court‘s holding and clarified that ―an unlawful employment practice occurs,
with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally
discriminatory purpose in violation of [Title VII] . . . when the seniority
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority
system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the
seniority system.‖190 In adopting this amendment, Congress signified that
there are certain claims where the interest of ―mak[ing] persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,‖ 191
overrides adherence to the EEOC time limitations.
Because Ledbetter‘s holding is substantially similar to Lorance‘s holding,
legislation is again needed to correct the Court. In both cases, ―the harsh
reality of [the] decision . . . [was] glaringly at odds with the purposes of Title
VII.‖192 Thus, it is proper to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 and create an exception to the 180-day
statute of limitations. Failure to do so, as mentioned above in Part IV.B.2,
would severely limit any member of a protected class‘s ability to bring a pay

183. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
184. Id. at 901–02.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 902–03.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 909–11.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000).
191. Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); see also Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 3, at 24.
192. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2183 (2007) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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discrimination claim. It is unrealistic to demand that a worker file 180 days
after the discriminatory pay decision was made.
In fact, as Garcia v. Brockway193 shows, Ledbetter has the potentional to
create enforcement of more unrealistic statutes of limitations beyond Title VI.
Therefore, Congress should not only uphold the prohibition of discrimination
―against any individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such
individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,‖194 with the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, but also protect civil rights in general by
passing more legislation preventing enforcement of unrealistic statute of
limitations in all types of civil rights claims. Such action is consistent with
President Barack Obama‘s stated goal of ―updat[ing] the social contract . . .
and ―reinvigorat[ing] civil rights,‖ so there is a good chance such legislation
will come in the near future.195 For now, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009 is a good and necessary first step to overcome the trend set in motion by
Ledbetter v. Goodyear.
ALLISON CIMPL-WIEMER

193. 503 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007).
194. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
195. Pear, supra note 173, at A13.
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